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COMMENTARY
THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE FREEDOM

TO KNOW: A COMMENT ON PROFESSOR
IvLLER'S THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY
GEORGE C. CISTIE t
The Assault on Privacy ' is an important book. It is also a very
good one. Professor Miller's purpose is to examine the effect of the
technological revolution of the last twenty years on individual privacy.
He explores the astonishing progress in computer development, and the
amazing feats of data collection, storage, retrieval, and computation and
arrangement that are now or will soon be possible and describes the
concrete uses to which those techniques can be applied. For example,
in a time of conscious social restructuring, they may be used to assist
the government in obtaining, ordering, and utilizing vast amounts of
information about our burgeoning population; they have made possible
the creation of regional credit bureaus, upon which the expansion of
consumer credit relies; they have added new dimensions to a struggling
educational system; and they have given industry a means for testing
and evaluating an expanding workforce. Independent of Professor
Miller's concern with the effect of these developments upon individual
privacy, his description of the new computer technology and its possible
applications in an increasingly complex world is of interest to anyone
seeking to understand one of the crucial developments of the twentieth
century.
Turning to the question of how society insures that the harnessing
of this intimidating technology is not accompanied by a serious loss of
human dignity, Professor Miller examines the federal government's
current management of the enormous quantity of personal information
that it has acquired. He then concisely traces the present legal framework-the so-called "law of privacy"-to which an individual aggrieved
by an application of the new computer technology might turn for protection and redress, and concludes by outlining a new legal framework
through which a fine balance between the need for technological effiI Professor of Law, Duke University. A.B. 1955, J.D. 1957, Columbia University; Dipl. Int'l. Law 1962, Cambridge University; S.J.D. 1966, Harvard University.
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ciency and the dignity of the individual might be achieved. In this regard Miller describes the types of technological advances needed to
improve the security of data collection and storage facilities and thus
afford the individual more effective protection. Finally, he includes a
lengthy and useful bibliography covering the entire range of questions
raised in his book.
I.

THE RIGHT TO ESCAPE FROM A RECORDED PAST

This is not a book about the law of privacy.' Focusing on the
underlying technological framework and on the larger questions of social
policy, the book is of significance to the lawyer not qua lawyer but
qua educated and concerned man. The importance of this feature of the
work is underlined by the unusually large amount of public discussion
it has engendered.? Although Professor Miller, like many of us, appears
at times to long wistfully for the comparative simplicity of the precomputer age, he is by no means a contemporary Luddite with the
anti-technological attitude that is fashionable in some quarters. His
purpose is to reconcile the technology necessary to meet the material
needs of our growing population with the values to which our culture
subscribes.
Public consciousness was briefly focused on the questions with
which Miller is concerned by the abortive proposals made several years
ago for the establishment of a national data bank,4 but no one has at
this juncture satisfactorily resolved these difficult questions. Almost
everyone would agree that a great many interests and values must be
weighed and an accommodation reached that is at once morally, socially,
and politically acceptable. The problem is defining an acceptable accommodation.
While the problem of individual privacy-the problem of protecting the life space of the individual in the name of human dignity-is not
a new problem, Professor Miller believes that the new technology has
materially increased the threat to the individual. Initially its advent
makes the preservation of confidentiality more difficult. The transmission and storage of information by electronic means is subject to an
increasingly sophisticated array of bugging devices, and the security
2 Professor Miller has written a detailed exposition of the law relating to privacy
elsewhere. Miller, Personal Privacy in the Computer Age: The Challenge of a New
Technology in an Information-OrientedSociety, 67 Mica. L. Rxv. 1091 (1969).
3The book has been favorably reviewed, e.g., N.Y. Times, Mar. 14, 1971, § 7,
at 3, cols. 1-8, an entire magazine has been organized around it, SATURDAY REv.,
Apr. 17, 1971, and it has been the subject of a number of commentaries on national
radio and television.
4The proposal and the controversy it aroused are discussed in A. MIujmR, supra
note 1, at 56-59.
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problem is compounded by the use of time-sharing techniques through
which many users of computer resources have access to a central computer for the storage and manipulation of data. Time-sharing is, of
course, an important advance allowing relatively small consumers of
computer time to use economically equipment otherwise beyond their
means, but it accentuates the possibility that one user may intentionally
or inadvertently obtain the confidential information of another. Because
computers have the capacity to process and store enormous amounts of
information, even small leaks in an information storage system become
unacceptable.
But Miller is not concerned only with preserving the secrecy of
confidential information. As the technical problems of computer information processing, storage, and retrieval are overcome, it becomes
increasingly less expensive to maintain indefinitely vast amounts of
information retrievable at will by those with access to the computer
memory banks. The social dimensions of this advance are exceedingly
complicated. A record of an individual's activities may now be maintained throughout his life, and, even though the information placed in
a computerized file may be within the "public domain," the existence
of the file creates a record from which the individual may never escape.
The individual's vulnerability is compounded by the fact that some of
the information may be inaccurate or, even if literally correct, subject
to misleading interpretations. The sheer expense of fully investigating
an individual, whose records could be scattered throughout county courthouses and the back issues of local newspapers, previously insured that
most people would never have their entire public lives compiled, collated,
and subject to casual examination by the curious. This is no longer
true, however, and Professor Miller pertinently asks whether the aggregate of information about an individual should be considered confidential
even though no single item is so denominated. In actual practice, of
course, computerized files will often also intermingle confidential with
nonconfidential information. In either case, Miller believes that the
right of an individual to escape from his past deserves legal protection,
and that even the demands of freedom of speech and inquiry cannot
completely override this right.
I have no dispute with Professor Miller's perception of the technological questions, and I believe that he states very well the fundamental
social questions that will require resolution as society grapples with the
new technology. The question is, will these difficult questions be
resolved by conscious social decisions or will the resolution of these
questions be reached in default of conscious decision? Since I disagree
with Professor Miller on where the proper line should be drawn in
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accommodating the underlying and often conflicting social values that
are involved, I feel that I can be of greatest service to the reader and to
the general public debate, which Miller is hoping to encourage and
assist by his book, if I raise clearly the ideological differences between
us. In stating our differences, I hope to make clear the difficult questions of social policy that will have to be resolved if we are ever to reach
a satisfactory solution to the social challenge presented by the new
technology.
Given that the privacy of the individual requires greater protection
in an era of unfolding technology, should that protection be afforded by
the law? If, as I would like to believe that most men would agree, an
individual should be able to escape from his past, how should the courts
give effect to that sentiment in the absence of legislative or administrative regulation, or even regardless of any such regulation?
Professor Miller refers approvingly ' to a famous case, Melvin v.
Reid,' involving a respectable housewife who had for a time concealed
her ignominious past. Known as Gabrielle Darley, she had been a
prostitute and a defendant in a notorious murder trial at which she was
acquitted. According to her complaint, she completely changed her
manner of life after acquittal. Soon thereafter, in 1918, she married
and took her place as a respected member of the community. In 1925 the
defendants released a motion picture advertised as the "true story" of
Gabrielle Darley. The film's admittedly truthful revelation of plaintiff's
previous life caused her to be ostracized by her neighbors and former
friends. Relying upon the growing law of privacy 7 and upon article 1
of the California Constitution, which declares that all men have certain
inalienable rights, among which are those of "pursuing and obtaining
safety and happiness," ' the court held that she had stated a cause of
action. Although the court records of the murder trial were open to
public inspection and reproduction, the court felt that the use of the
plaintiff's maiden name "was unnecessary and indelicate, and a willful
and wanton disregard of that charity which should actuate us in our
social intercourse, and which should keep us from unnecessarily holding
up another to the scorn and contempt of upright members of society." 9
Professor Miller regrets that courts do not seem to have followed
Melvin v. Reid, noting in particular that in Sidis v. F-R Publishing
5Id. 181-82.
0112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931).
7 That there might be such a right was, of course, suggested by Warren &
Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193 (1890).
8 CAL. CONsT. art. 1 (1879).
9 112 Cal. App. at 291, 297 P. at 93.
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Corp."0 the Second Circuit refused to grant a remedy to a former child
prodigy who was once the subject of considerable public discussion in
the newspapers. Having lectured to distinguished- mathematicians on
four-dimensional bodies at the age of eleven and having been graduated
from Harvard College at sixteen "amid considerable public attention," "
Sidis withdrew completely from public view and became "an insignificant clerk," living alone in "a hall bedroom of Boston's shabby south
end."

12

The New Yorker published an article twenty-seven years later

which, while not wholly unsympathetic to Sidis, described his untidy
room, his curious mannerisms, and his enthusiasm for collecting streetcar transfers and the lore of the Okamakamesset Indians.m The court
observed that Sidis would have been able to recover under the standards
set forth in the germinal privacy article by Warren and Brandeis,14 but,
as Sidis had been a public figure in his day, it was unwilling to play the
role of censor and delineate the limits of legitimate public interest."
Miller also recognizes that the retreat from Melvin v. Reid may,
8
after Time, Inc. v. Hill,"
be constitutionally compelled. In that famous
case, Life magazine incorrectly described a play, The Desperate Hours,
as being an accurate reenactment of the experience of the Hill family
that had been held captive by a group of escaped convicts. Neither the
play nor the novel upon which it was based, however, mentioned the
Hill family; moreover, both were clearly fictionalized accounts, falsely
portraying the convicts as violent men disposed towards sexually abusive
language. In reversing a judgment for the plaintiff resting upon New
York's privacy statute,1 7 the Supreme Court assumed that if the Life
article were a faithful description of the play no action would lie.'
Since the article was false, the Court, solicitous of preserving the freedom of the press, remanded the case for a determination whether the
article was published "with knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard of the truth." 19
Professor Miller hopes that Hill will not be used to completely
undermine the utility of the privacy action.2" In my judgment Melvin
10 113

F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940).
11 Id. at 807.
12Id.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 809; see note 7 supra.
15 113 F2d 809.

16 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
17 N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51 (1948).
18 385 U.S. at 383, 391-94.

19 Id. at 388.
20

A. Mu=lza, supra note 1, at 191-99.
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v. Reid should be repudiated, as indeed it was in the pre-Hill case of
Barbieri v. News-Journal Co."' In that case a newspaper, reporting
the introduction of a bill making whipping a mandatory punishment for
certain crimes, mentioned plaintiff by name as having been the last
person flogged in the state. Plaintiff contended that his name was of
little importance and should have been omitted from the news account,
but the Delaware court was unwilling to embark upon the task of deciding what about the story, which was admittedly one of public interest,
was or was not necessary to the proper exercise of the public's right to
know facts which were of public record anyway. 2 I believe that this
decision is correct. Some courts have attempted to resuscitate the
privacy concept by allowing a cause of action upon a showing of
malice,' but however much they may regret, as I do, that the press
insists upon reporting personal information, I do not believe that there
should be judicial intervention. I generally concur with Miller that a
legislative solution would generally be preferable, but I am opposed to
that type of legal intervention as well. I have serious doubts, for
example, about the wisdom and constitutionality of statutes that prohibit
the publication of the name, address, or photograph of rape victims and
that provide criminal or civil sanctions for statutory violations. 4 More
importantly, as will appear, I think such statutes are unwise.

II.

DATA COLLECTION AND DISSEMINATION

Since the more important points of difference between Professor
Miller and myself concern broader questions of social policy, I shall
hereafter assume a general familiarity with the copious literature on the
law of privacy and adopt a useful, if somewhat simplified, analytical
framework.
Distinguishing collectors from disseminators of information, while
not always feasible-many users of information are, of course, both
collectors and disseminators, and some only disseminate information
that they have themselves collected-will perhaps prove helpful. Where
the government is the collector, the fourth and fifth amendments inhibit
it from using impermissibly acquired information in criminal cases,2 5
2156 Del. 67, 189 A.2d 773 (1963). See also Kalven, Privacy in Tort LawWere Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAw & CONTEmP. PR0B. 326 (1966) (preHill criticism of development of tort of invasion of privacy).
2256 Del. at 73, 189 A2d at 776.
2 Text accompanying note 72 infra.
24
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANNt. §§ 794.03, 794.04 (1965); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-81
(1962) ; Wis. STAT. AN. § 942.02 (1958). A very recent case with implications
also suggesting the unconstitutionality of such statutes is Rosenbloom v. Metromedia,
Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
USee eg Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) ; Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Boyd v. United States,
116 U.S. 616 (1886).
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and the first amendment prevents, absent the most pressing demonstration of need, the forcible extraction of information about ideological
beliefs and political associations.2 6 Miller, realizing that a wise government must exercise judicious restraint in seeking information from and
about its citizens, proposes an independent administrative agency to
supervise the federal government's data-collection and data-use procedures." I think this is an excellent proposal. A definitive statutory
solution would be premature at the present time, and a high-sounding,
but overly vague, set of statutory principles to be applied by the courts
with little additional guidance might do more harm than good. Such
an agency must ensure that the individual is clearly advised that he need
not comply with a request to voluntarily divulge personal data. The
agency must also guarantee that disclosure of excessive information is
not exacted as the price for a government benefit 2 and that justifiable
expectations of confidentiality are honored.'
Statutes reinforcing the
common law obligation of private parties to keep as confidential
information imparted under promises of secrecy or in the course of
confidential relations and statutes strengthening criminal and civil
penalties for eavesdropping, bugging, and theft of records would be
widely supported. Indeed, the common law of privacy functions most
impressively in the area of unauthorized intrusion, and the question of
how to deal with the collector of information has therefore not been
overly controversial. While the practical difficulties are many, most
thoughtful persons would not have many serious reservations about
seeking solutions along the lines just suggested. Nevertheless, although
the problem of how to deal with the collector of information is not as
difficult as is the problem of how to deal with the disseminator, it still
has some very difficult aspects, and it is to these we must now turn
before reaching the even more difficult problem of how to deal with
the disseminator.
One about whom data has been gathered certainly has an interest
in insuring that the information is at least accurate. The Fair Credit
26

See, e.g., Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17 (1968); Stanford v. Texas, 379
U.S.2 476 (1965); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
7 A. MILLER, supra note 1, at 234-38.
(policeman cannot be com28 Cf. Gardener v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968)
pelled to give up privilege against self-incrimination in order to retain his job).
29 One difficult aspect of the "confidentiality" problem has revolved around the
question whether a conversation between a criminal defendant and an informer who
has been invited into the defendant's home can be electronically recorded. The
question with which the courts are wrestling is not whether such conversations can
ever be recorded but whether a search warrant is necessary before such recordings
can be made. As of the time of writing, the latest decision of the Court on the
subject is United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971), a case involving the planting
of a microphone on a government informer and the transmission of the conversations
via radio to a recording device. In his dissent, Justice Douglas quotes from Professor
Miller on the effect of electronic surveillance in a computer age. 401 U.S. at 757.
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Reporting Act of 1970 3' reflects this concern, providing that an investigative consumer report, which may explore character and general
reputation,31 cannot be prepared unless the consumer is notified by mail
within three days of a creditor's request for the report.3" The consumer
is then entitled upon written request to a "complete and accurate disclosure of the nature and scope of the investigation requested." 3 The
Act also requires every consumer reporting agency, upon request, to
disclose to the consumer "[t] he nature and substance of all information
(except medical information) in its . . . files at the time of the request"

and the sources of the information, with the exception that the sources
used solely for the compilation of an investigative consumer report need
not be disclosed.3 4 The Act provides procedures for the correction of
disputed consumer reporting agency records 11 and prohibits, in most
circumstances, the furnishing of reports containing stale information,
such as arrests, convictions, and judgments occurring seven years before
the report, and bankruptcies antedating the report by fourteen years.38
It is unfortunate that the federal government is unwilling to exercise
such restraint in using its own employment security clearance forms.
The Act further limits the categories of persons who can request reports3 7 Noncompliance with the Act's requirements constitutes both
an unfair trade practice subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade
Commission 38 and a basis for civil liability.3 9 While the Act is poorly
drafted, thus inviting avoidance of its prohibitions,' and while it could
30 Pub. L. No. 91-508, § 601, 84 Stat. 1128 (1970), amending Consumer Credit
Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-77 (Supp. V, 1970) (codified at 15 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1681-81t (Supp. 1971)).
3115 U.S.C.A. § 1681a(e) (Supp. 1971).
32 Id. § 1681d(a) (1).
;33 Id. §1681d (b).
34
§ 1681g(a). The Act recognizes that by disclosing to the consumer the
sources of information, an informant is stripped of some of his privacy. The Act
therefore limits the liability of an informant to the consumer, in an action for defamation, invasion of privacy, or negligence, to situations where "false information [is]
furnished with malice or willful intent to injure such consumer." Id. § 1681h(e).
-3 Id. § 1681i.

36 Id. § 1681c. These limitations do not apply to credit or life insurance transactions involving $50,000 or more, or to employment if the salary is to be in excess
of $20,000. Id.§1681c(b).
37 Id. § 1681b.
38 Id. § 1681s.

39 Id. § 1681n (willful noncompliance) ; id. § 1681o (negligent noncompliance).
Punitive damages may be assessed for willful noncompliance, id. § 1681n(2), and
reasonable attorney's fees are recoverable in successful actions for either willful or
negligent noncompliance. Id. §§ 1681n(3), o (2).
In addition, an action may be brought in the federal courts without regard to the
amount in controversy. Id. § 1681b.
40 For example, to use an illustration which Professor Miller himself called to
my attention during a recent conversation, § 605 (a) (4) of the Act, id. § 1681c(a) (5),
prohibits the furnishing of "obsolete" information and "[r]ecords of arrest, indictment, or conviction of crime which, from date of disposition, release, or parole,
antedate the report by more than seven years." Since the statute refers to "records"
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have aimed at a higher standard of consumer protection, most advocates
of individual privacy, including Professor Miller 4' and myself, would
applaud the Act as a step in the right direction.
If disclosure to the consumer and giving him an opportunity to
correct his record as compiled by a private entity are good things,
affording the individual citizen the same rights against government
seems logical. Indeed, Senator Bayh and Representative Koch have recently introduced a Citizen's Privacy Bill ' which would require the
federal government to notify a citizen when it intends to open a record
on him, to advise him whenever disclosure of any collected information
is commanded by the Freedom of Information Act, to obtain his permission before divulging any part of that record to government agencies or
private parties, and to allow him to inspect and correct the record.
There are two troublesome exemptions to the protection accorded the
individual: the provisions do not apply to records "specifically required
by Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of the national security," nor to investigatory files compiled by law enforcement agencies
except where "such records have been maintained for a longer period
than reasonably necessary to commence prosecution or other action." 43
Since it seems unlikely that a President would exercise his discretion in
a manner most favorable to the individual, the protection actually
afforded by this or other legislation containing a similar exemption may
be largely illusory. Nevertheless, if the government maintains national
arrest records pursuant to an announced policy, I am unprepared to
assert that the individual should not have a right to note on the record
that his arrest was judicially determined to have lacked probable cause.44
of "arrest . . . or conviction," the normal inference would be that only furnishing
copies of the official records is proscribed. The reporting of the fact of the arrest
presumably is not covered. It will be interesting to see what the courts are able to
do with provisions like this.
41 See A. MI.R,
szepra note 1, at 86-88.
42S. 975, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) ; H.R. 5974, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
The proposed bill was recently amended to impose an express obligation upon government agencies to correct records and to provide for a review board to hear complaints
from aggrieved citizens. See 117 CONG. REc. S11,354-55 (daily ed. July 19, 1971).
The bill is very similar to one first introduced by Representative Koch in 1969.
H.R. 7214, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). See also A. MILLER, supra note 1, at 226-27.
43 S. 975, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 552a(d) (1971) ; H.R. 5974, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
§552a(d) (1971).
44 Cf. Menard v. Mitchell, 430 F.2d 486 (D.C. Cir. 1970), where the court
refused to affirm the grant of the government's motion for summary judgment in a
suit raising the expungement issue and remanded the case for a hearing on the merits.
On remand, Judge Gesell found that there was probable cause for the arrest, ruling
that the crucial issue was not whether there was probable cause for the arrest but
rather who could have access to the information. Accordingly, he enjoined the
Attorney General from supplying Menard's arrest record to prospective private
and state government employers but not to federal government agencies which might
be considering employing him. Menard v. Mitchell, 328 F. Supp. 718 (D.D.C. 1971).
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The Fair Credit Reporting Act professes to impose certain duties
and prohibitions upon a "consumer reporting agency," defined as "any
person which, for monetary fees . . . regularly engages . . . in the

practice of assembling or evaluating consumer credit information or
other information on consumers for the purpose of furnishing consumer
reports to third parties .

.

. " '5

Some restraints are imposed on

persons other than consumer reporting agencies. For example, "[a]
person may not procure or cause to be prepared an investigative consumer report" unless "it is clearly and accurately disclosed to the
consumer that an investigative consumer report including information
as to his character, general reputation, personal characteristics, and
mode of living . . . may be made" or unless "the report is to be used

for employment purposes for which the consumer has not specifically
applied." 46 But only a consumer report, a report prepared by a consumer reporting agency, containing character and reputation information is reached. The notice and disclosure requirements thus do not
apply to character data secured from other sources. Nevertheless,
"[w]henever credit for personal, family, or household purposes" is
denied on the basis of information obtained from "a person other than
a consumer reporting agency," the user of the information must upon
written request disclose the nature of the information and must advise
the consumer of "his right to make such written request at the time
[an] adverse action is communicated .

.

.

."

The Act does not,

however, attempt to restrict the information that can be directly collected
by a creditor or any other person. Restricting such data gathering
activities, as opposed to regulating the uses to which the fruits of such
investigations are put, would severely limit the individual's freedom to
know and would raise grave constitutional difficulties. Such restrictions
would be particularly suspect with regard to information that is of
public record and therefore within the public domain.
The underlying assumption of the Fair Credit Reporting Actone shared by Miller-is that it is possible to demarcate and regulate
activity which is purely commercial. Certainly legislation of this type
could not apply to newspapers. It is well known, for example, that the
New York Times and undoubtedly many other newspapers and national
wire services prepare obituaries of many people well in advance of the
inevitable. The Times' obituaries, which are supplied to other papers
by the New York Times News Service, have not always been favorable
to the deceased. It seems clear to me that one who suspects that he is
45 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681a(f) (Supp. 1971).
46 Id. § 1681d (a).
47 Id. § 1681ma(b).
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the subject of such an obituary should be given neither a right to know
whether the Times has in fact prepared an obituary nor the opportunity
to examine the biography with the attendant right to litigate its accuracy. Derogatory information in newspaper files is, of course, not
limited to that contained in prospective obituaries. While the Act prohibits consumer reporting agencies from supplying information about
stale bankruptcies, arrests, convictions, and judgments, a general circulation newspaper cannot be placed under such restrictions. One might
argue that newspapers should be allowed to collect and supply such information only about newsworthy figures, but the Supreme Court has
thus far, and I think rightly so, shown a marked reluctance to entertain
any such limitation on the rights of the press. If the New York Times
News Service is not a consumer reporting agency even though it
regularly collects and supplies information about "consumers" to its subscribers for monetary consideration, what about a trade paper or magazine? 4 ' Could a private detective agency be a consumer agency? Apparently so. Since the Act includes information for which there is a
"legitimate business need

. .

.

in connection with a business transaction

involving the consumer," '9 a lawyer utilizing the services of such an
organization so as to obtain evidence about the character of a witness
or party might have to advise the affected party of that fact and, upon
request, reveal the substance of the report. If detective agency reports
are indeed covered by the Act, they could not contain the proscribed
classes of stale information. Whether or not this result was intended
and whether or not it could pass constitutional muster, I find this result
undesirable.
The difficulties created by legislative proposals directed in large
part against collectors are multiplied when we turn to deal primarily
with disseminators of information, those who seek to disseminate information that they have not acquired by breaching any confidential
relationship or by theft or other unlawful intrusion or practice. Indeed,
many disseminators do not themselves collect information in the first
instance, and even more, while they do collect information, also disseminate information that they have not themselves collected.
In the illustrative case of Dodd v. Pearson5 two former
employees of the late Senator Dodd, with the assistance of current
employees, xeroxed files revealing that he had personally appropriated
campaign funds, and turned over the copies to Drew Pearson. The
48 Cf. Grove v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 438 F2d 433, 437-38 (3d Cir. 1971),
which held that Dun & Bradstreet is not entitled, in a libel action, to the protections
afforded by the Court to the press.
49 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681b(3) (E) (Supp. 1971).
80410 F.2d 701 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 947 (1969).

ASSAULT ON PRIVACY

subsequent public disclosure in Pearson's newspaper column of the discreditable information irreparably damaged Dodd. He failed to secure
his party's nomination to stand for re-election and was reduced to running unsuccessfully as an independent. The court held that Dodd had
no remedy against Pearson since the latter had not been responsible
for the theft and copying of the files and since the revelations bore on
Dodd's fitness for public office. Dodd could seek recovery against
those who had misappropriated his files, but the public's right to know
prevented him from halting the dissemination of the information.
Once the files had been stolen and wrongfully duplicated, the information in effect became part of the public domain. 1 Professor Miller and
others

2

have viewed Dodd as an expansion of the law of privacy be-

cause the court "approve[d] the extension of the tort of invasion of
privacy to instances of intrusion, whether by physical trespass or not,
into spheres from which an ordinary man in plaintiff's position could
reasonably expect that the particular defendant should be excluded." 3
The case undoubtedly is a welcome extension, though it seems to me
that its enduring importance lies in its recognition that restrictions on
collectors of information do not necessarily bind disseminators.
Any discussion of the rights and liabilities of the disseminator requires a working definition of what information is within the nebulous
concept "public domain." I shall define information as in the public
domain if the collector did not receive it in confidence and did not
acquire it as the result of unlawful intrusion, including bugging telephones, planting microphones in private homes, and breaking and entering into places where files are stored. To take a concrete example,
about twenty years ago a couple embraced at the Farmer's Market in
Los Angeles, and a wandering photographer captured the moment on
film. The photograph appeared shortly thereafter in several widely
circulated magazines. The California Supreme Court denied recovery,
holding that, because the couple acted voluntarily in public, they relinquished any right to prevent a photograph of their act from being
51The theft of government documents poses a different problem. Insofar as
they are clearly marked as government documents and bear a security classification,
the government may have a right, generally unavailable to private persons, to impose
a requirement of confidentiality upon persons who unwittingly come across such
documents. At the very least, the government may possess the power to enforce that
right by civil actions for damages, by criminal prosecutions, and possibly, in some
limited situations where national security is at stake, by injunctive relief. Cf. New
York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).

52A. M'm, supra note 1, at 175-76; e.g., Nader v. General Motors Corp., 25
N.Y.2d 560, 574, 255 N.E.2d 765, 773, 307 N.Y.S.2d 647, 658 (1970) (Breitel, J.,
concurring).

53410 F.2d at 704 (dictum).
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Professor Miller disapproves of the case,55
published in a magazine.but I think the decision is the only correct one. I believe that anyone
ought to be allowed to publish anything that is in the public domain.
I therefore disapprove of the Fair Credit Reporting Act insofar as it
restricts the right to disseminate facts of public record, such as bankruptcies, arrests, and judgments. The commercial-noncommercial distinction can support a right to correct information that one might
hesitate to grant as against newspapers but not the suppression of true
information that is a matter of public record. The Act is tolerable
because it attempts to confine its operation to certain commercial relationships and does not restrict what one can discover on one's own.
The Act is in this respect like proposals to "regulate" obscenity without
trampling over free speech, for example, by making obscene literature
expensive but not impossible to obtain.5"
I have chosen the Fair Credit Reporting Act for extended comment because, although it "simply does not provide us with adequate
protection against possible misuse of the credit network of the future," "
even its partial protection is given at the expense of freedom of communication, and its expressed principles seriously conflict with the
principles of free speech and inquiry. The computer with its capacity
to accumulate large amounts of stale information admittedly can, as
Miller describes so well, trap a man in the record of his past. I am not
insinuating that people should anaesthetize themselves against the
dignity-destroying conduct of their fellows until such time as society
becomes more tolerant and forgiving, but I do suggest that, despite the
inadequacy of self-regulation, legislation of this type excessively impinges upon freedom of communication.
Everyone recognizes that a large part of the problem is the disparity of power both among individuals and institutions and between
government and the more fragmented elements of society. One might,
thus, sympathize with a recent decision restraining the official printing
and distribution of a House Committee on Internal Security report,
surveying the honoraria given college speakers thought to be associated
with allegedly subversive organizations, on the grounds that publication
Gill v. Hearst Pub. Co., 40 Cal. 2d 224, 229-30, 253 P.2d 441, 444 (1953).
MILLEI, supra note 1, at 185-86.
Miller classifies the case under the
pejorative heading "The Consent and Waiver Placebos." He feels that the court's
concern that prohibiting the reproduction of the photograph might impede newsgathering activities was "a judicial red herring." Id. 185. I agree that "waiver" is
a misnomer, but that is irrelevant because a man is free to photograph what he
sees on public streets.
56 See Kristol, Pornography, Obscenity and the Case for Censorship, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 28, 1971, § 6 (Magazine), at 24, 114-16.
7 A. ML=R, supra note 1, at 88.
54
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would inhibit free speech and assembly." The court felt, however, that
it could not prevent the printing of the report in the Congressional
Record or its dissemination in the course of the normal distribution of
the Record." The reproduction and distribution of the relevant pages
of the Record by a private party presumably could not be constitutionally prevented. The court's solution is made even more troublesome
if it is supposed that the Committee wished to distribute information
that had already appeared in the press or that, unlike the actual case,
copies of the report were not printed for free distribution but were only
to be sold for a price approximating the government's out-of-pocket
costs.
The power of government to collect information obtainable by
curious private parties raises a great many difficult questions. Demonstrators engaging in sit-ins in a college president's office have unsuccessfully argued, for example, that state police could not photograph
or otherwise record observations of their conduct, even though equivalent photographs and observations could be obtained from press clippings."0 Such arguments are untenable, though there are official
surveillance practices, such as the intensive observation of people who
have never committed a crime and are unlikely to do so, that are less
justifiable. 1 While private parties might be able to observe others on
the public streets, Miller suggests, 2 and I most definitely agree, that
such surveillance by public authorities interferes too much with human
freedom and dignity.
Should the courts intervene to enjoin such surveillance where no
prosecution or other official action is contemplated? My answer-and
here again I must disagree with the approach Professor Miller seems to
SIHentoff v. Ichord, 318 F. Supp. 1175 (D.D.C. 1970). On the question of
official "misuse" of arguably publicly available information, see Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971), in which the Court struck down a statute pursuant
to which the local chief of police could forbid the sale of liquor to certain people by
posting their names in all retail liquor outlets without notice or a hearing. The chief
of police of appellee's home town had, without hearing, done just that, thus not only
embarrassing her but also making the sale of liquor to her by these establishments
illegal.
59 318 F. Supp. at 1179.
60 Anderson v. Sills 56 NJ. 210, 217-18, 265 A.2d 678, 682-83 (1970), rev'g
106 N.J. Super. 545, 256 A.2d 298 (Sup. Ct. 1969). The suit was brought for
declaratory and injunctive relief against the use of a reporting system claimed to
have been instituted as the result of the distribution by the New Jersey Attorney
General to local officials of a memorandum entitled Civil Disorders-the Role of
Local, County and State Government. Certainly, as the lower court pointed out,
the range of possible surveillance would cover most forms of political activity. 106
NJ. Super. at 556-57, 256 A.2d at 304-05.
61 More recently, U.S. District Court Judge Constance Baker Motley of the
Southern District of New York issued an injunction ordering the New Rochelle,
N.Y. police department to stop the surveillance of persons "neither suspected of
criminal activity nor engaged in criminal activity." N.Y. Times, June 23, 1971, at
47, col. 8.
62A. M.Lm, supra note 1, at 200-02.
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favor-would be no for several reasons. First, it is difficult for courts
to weigh all the relevant considerations necessary to impose a solution
upon the investigatory agencies. The public mood, moreover, is inconstant. There have been too many assassinations of public figures in
recent years, and no one who has lived through these times is unaware
of the outrage that the assassins were not under prior observation.
It does not do the fabric of society much good to have the courts
charged with having been instrumental in causing the death of a President. A second more important reason against judicial intervention is
the possibility that the relationship between the branches of our governmental system would be strained. A President will always authorize
the surveillance of those believed to imperil national security and, in
response to what may be considered to be unrealistic judicial demands,
disguise surveillance activities or refuse to admit to them. This would
be a spurious triumph of law.
The legislatively established administrative agency that Miller so
strongly recommends " would be a more appropriate body to handle the
problem. Such an agency could develop workable criteria, and its performance could be subjected to continuing oversight by the appropriate
Senate and House committees. This may, however, be an area where
specific statutory criteria for governmental participation in surveillance
of private citizens would be the best solution. Such a statute could
provide civil and criminal penalties for flagrant breaches of its policy,
though whether a particular subject of surveillance is likely to commit
a crime must in large measure be entrusted to the discretion of lawenforcement authorities. It would be unfair in most instances of mistaken judgment to impose a crippling financial or personal burden on
an individual officer. The seriousness and likelihood of a possible crime
are each relevant factors as to the possibility of physical danger. If the
crime is a serious one or involves a risk of physical danger to the public,
surveillance might be justified when the likelihood of its commission
would not justify surveillance for a less serious offense or one involving
no risk of physical danger to the public. One of the prime values in
enactment of a statute is that it could provide a basis for incisive congressional oversight and judicial review by establishing categories of
surveillance requiring a high degree of justification, such as surveillance
of political rallies or of civilians by military personnel," and by requiring regular reports to the Congress on the number of occasions in which
law-enforcement authorities have engaged in such activity. Any statute
63
See text accompanying note 27 supra.
64 Senator Ervin's Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Judiciary
Committee is currently investigating the Government's surveillance policies and has
made the Army's now-discontinued surveillance of civilians a major subject of inquiry.
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governing surveillance activities should address itself to the question of
the possible uses of gathered information, restricting the uses of information obtained by surveillance in cases where the justification is
dubious rather than attempting, perhaps futilely, to compel the complete
abstention from surveillance.
III. FREE SPEECH AS AN ULTIMATE VALUE
It should be clear that I have been applying to the problem of
privacy doctrines and principles that seem to be present, at least implicitly, in the Supreme Court's decisions in the libel area. Professor
Miller suggests that the analogy between libel and privacy is not particularly apt.' Recognizing that the Court did treat Hill as a libel case,
he hopes that the Court will not completely assimilate the two. Miller
sees the difficulty in asserting that liability for making true statements
should be equivalent to or greater than that imposed for making false
statements, but he believes that disparate treatment can be justified
because of the different rationalizations for the two torts." Libel remedies have been materially reduced by the Court in the name of freedom
of speech. Perhaps one reason for this reduction is use of the Millian
justification for freedom of speech that truth will predominate in the
long run. 7 In the privacy area, however, it is the truth that hurts, and
therefore Millian justifications for free speech are irrelevant. As far as
I know, the Court has never accepted the Millian rationale for free
speech.6" I hope it never does. It is not at all clear to me that truth will
prevail, and, indeed, I feel fairly confident in asserting that, considering
that contemporary newspaper reports are a major source for historians,
the only certitude is that the truth will be impossible to ascertain. But
even were the Millian argument correct, I believe that free speech is a
fundamental value in our society and should be as immune from erosion
in the name of privacy as it is from the principles of libel, if not more so.
MmLmR, supra note 1, at 192-93.
The position that invading another's privacy with true speech should
receive less protection than false speech has also been put forth in Nimmer, The
Right to Speak from Times to Time: First Amendment Theory Applied to Libel and
Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CALI. L. REv. 935 (1968). Nimmer's position is criticized
in Cohen, A New Niche for the Fault Principle: A Forthcoming Newsworthiness
Privilege in Libel Cases?, 18 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 371, 382-83 (1970).
1671 have described this position as "Millian" because it is a customary label
given to this view. Obviously, John Stuart Mill's position cannot be completely
stated in a few words, and I am making no attempt to do so. Mill contended that
only where discussion is free will truth win out and recognized that truth can be
suppressed by persecution, perhaps even permanently. J. S. MIuE, ON LIBERTY 24-39
(The World's Classics ed. 1966).
6s Cf. Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron, 401 U.S. 295 (1971). In this case the
Court reversed a libel judgment entered against a small-town newspaper which had
printed a false story indicating that Damron had been charged with perjury. Damron,
mayor of the town and a candidate for county tax assessor, had not been so charged,
15 A.
06

1d. 193.
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Lower courts, recognizing, as it seems to me they must, that
penalizing truthful speech cannot be made as easy as penalizing false
speech, will undoubtedly attempt to amalgamate privacy and defamation
to permit recovery for invasion of privacy where a libel or slander action
would lie were the statements false. This was, for example, the approach of the Supreme Court of California in the recent case of Briscoe
v. Reader's Digest Association, Inc.69 The facts of the case were as
follows: The plaintiff, in his complaint, admitted that in 1956 he and
another man hijacked a truck in Kentucky. He claimed that he had
since "abandoned his life of shame" and had become entirely rehabilitated. Eleven years after the incident the defendant published an article
entitled The Big Business of Hijacking, in which appeared the following
sentence: "Typical of many beginners, Marvin Briscoe . . . stole a
'valuable-looking' truck . . . and then fought a gun battle with the
local police, only to learn that [he] had hijacked four bowling-pin
spotters." 70 Plaintiff alleged that his daughter and friends, learning
of the incident for the first time, "scorned and abandoned him." 71 The
court, while repeating many of the arguments made forty years earlier
in Melvin v. Reid, remanded the case with cautious instructions to
determine "(1) whether plaintiff had become a rehabilitated member of
society, (2) whether identifying him as a former criminal would be
highly offensive and injurious to the reasonable man, (3) whether defendant published this information with a reckless disregard for its
offensiveness, and (4) whether any independent justification for printing plaintiff's identity existed." ' Although the court indicated that a
publisher always has reason to know that identification as a former
criminal is highly offensive,73 it is questionable whether the plaintiff will
meet the high standards of proof and succeed on the merits. Nevertheless, even if plaintiff's victory is only a Pyrrhic one, the case is disturbing. In any defamation action the plaintiff must initially overcome
the defense of truth and, if the action is against the press, must then
show actual malice in the sense of a culpable disregard for the truth.
In a privacy action, where truth is conceded, the plaintiff's only obstacle
in an action against the press is the actual malice (moral offensiveness)
but he nevertheless lost the election held two weeks after the story's publication. In
reversing, the Court extended the reasoning of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254 (1964), concluding that since Damron was clearly a public figure actual
malice on the part of the newspaper must be shown. The Court could not have failed
to realize that in such situations, even if the truth does win out, it may be too late
to help the plaintiff.
69 4 Cal. 3d -, 483 P.2d 34, 93 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1971).
o Id. at - 483 P.2d at 36, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 868.
71 Id. at -- 483 P.2d at 36, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 868.
72 Id. at-, 483 P2d at 44, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 876.
73 Id. at - n.18, 483 P.2d at 43-44 n.18, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 875-76 n.18.
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requirement with its accompanying "newsworthiness" components.
Though I hesitate to make an absolute judgment, I can only conceive
of a right to bring an action for invasion of privacy in situations of
the type in Melvin v. Reid and in Briscoe where there is the clearest
possible proof of a deliberate intention to injure. Any lesser standard
would materially conflict with our society's commitment to a free press.
Fortunately, however, although I would not discount the social
value of rhetoric, there is more than rhetoric available to meet the demands for greater protection of individual privacy. The effect of stale
information can be mitigated by regulating the uses to which that information can be put. We could provide that, absent convincing evidence that those arrested but never convicted are materially worse
credit or insurance risks, such information cannot justify refusing credit
or insurance seven years later.74 Any palpably increased risk could be
reflected in an increased charge rather than by a complete denial of the
service. The criteria that employers use in evaluating prospective employees could be regulated to prohibit reliance upon obsolete information
or information concerning an individual's personal life style.75 Legislative and administrative regulations can be molded to appreciably
protect the individual without impinging upon the freedom to speak
freely and to seek knowledge. To seek reform in the privacy area by
attempting to regulate speech itself rather than the uses to which it can
be put requires a confidence that freedom of speech will not be suppressed and that Miller's terms, "offensively intimate facts" 76 and "independent contemporary significance," "' can be effectively employed by
the courts to achieve the proper balance between privacy and free speech.
I do not have that confidence.
74 Although almost never discussed in the privacy context, one of the most unfair
uses of stale information is the use of "old" convictions to impeach the credibility of
witnesses. This use of stale information makes it very difficult and often impossible
for a previously convicted criminal defendant to escape conviction in a case where
his defense rests largely on his own testimony.
For a statute preventing the use of a prior conviction for impeachment purposes
more than ten years after the expiration of the sentence imposed for the witness's
most recent conviction, see District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-358, § 133(b) (2) (B), 84 Stat. 551, amending D.C.
CODE ANN. § 14-305 (1967). This statute, although a tremendous improvement over
the practice still followed in many jurisdictions, overruled the doctrine announced in
Luck v. United States, 348 F2d 763, 767-69 (D.C. Cir. 1965), which was more
flexible and probably more favorable to criminal defendants.
75 Cf. McConnell v. Anderson, 316 F. Supp. 809 (D. Minn. 1970) (state university cannot constitutionally reject an applicant for a position as a librarian on the
grounds that he is a homosexual). See also Gregory v. Litton Systems, Inc., 316
F. Supp. 401 (C.D. Cal. 1970) (employer's policy of rejecting applicants who have
been previously arrested but not convicted held unlawful under the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, when the effect was to discriminate against blacks).
76 A. MiLLER, supra note 1, at 193.
77 Id. 196-97.
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A textbook illustration of the balancing which the courts would be
asked to undertake is presented in Commonwealth v. Wiseman.7" Wiseman obtained official permission to make an educational documentary
film of the Massachusetts Correctional Institute at Bridgewater. The
permission was subject to certain conditions designed to protect the
privacy of the inmates and patients.79 Wiseman produced a film about
the criminally insane entitled Titicut Follies, and, as one who has seen
it, I can testify that it is a moving portrayal of conditions at Bridgewater. The film is not without sympathy for the staff, who were
struggling with excruciatingly difficult problems in an obsolete institution with inadequate resources, or for the depressing plight of the
inmates, but it shows inmates in pathetic and embarrassingly indecent
situations. Unknown to the Massachusetts authorities, the film was
shown at two film festivals, in one of which it won first prize as the best
documentary film of the year. Wiseman contracted for the commercial
distribution of the film, and it was first shown in New York where it
was advertised as making " 'Marat Sade' look like 'Holiday on Ice.' " "
The Attorney General of Massachusetts, concluding that the film went
beyond the scope of the consent granted by the Massachusetts authorities and that the film was an unauthorized invasion of the inmates'
privacy, brought suit to enjoin future exhibitions.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts agreed with the
trial court that Wiseman had not adequately complied with the conditions of the permission to make the film, one of which was to photograph
only inmates legally competent to sign releases. Treating Wiseman as
primarily a collector of information who had breached the conditions
under which he was allowed to make the film, I have no difficulty with
the legal system's providing remedies to protect the interests of the
inmates. Furthermore, regardless of the conditions that were or were
not imposed, perhaps a court should hold that no one may grant permission to photograph mentally incompetent inmates within a state
institution unless the photographs are necessary for treatment of the
patients or would aid in the efficient administration of the institution,
such as for identification purposes. It is disturbing to note, however,
78356 Mass. -, 249 N.E.2d 610 (1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 960 (1970). For
a discussion of the Wiseman case and its background, see Comment, The "Titicut
Follies" Case: Limiting the Public Interest Privilege, 70 COLUm. L. REv. 359 (1970).
The film contains scenes of forced nose feeding, skin searches of naked patients, and
pathetic attempts of prisoners to hide their genitals.
The denial of certiorari must be read cautiously because the Court apparently
found an independent state ground, namely Wiseman's failure to comply with the
conditions imposed when he received permission to make the film. 398 U.S. at 960
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
79 356 Mass. at -, 249 N.E.2d at 612.
80 Comment, supra note 78, at 361.
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that the appellate court modified the trial court's decree that the film
be destroyed, in order to permit exhibition to specialized audiences, such
as "legislators, judges, lawyers, sociologists, social workers, doctors,
psychiatrists, students in these or related fields, and organizations dealing with the social problems of custodial care and mental infirmity," "
provided that "a brief explanation that changes and improvements have
taken place in the institution" 82 be included in the film.
Professor Miller states that "[a] lthough the decision is vulnerable
to criticism for other reasons, its balancing approach should be applauded since it enabled the court to protect privacy to a considerable
degree while preserving the free flow of information thought necessary
to protect the public interest." 83 It is precisely this balancing that I
find most disturbing. I also find distasteful the court's order, which
implies that some people's right to know is better than others'. An
earlier federal district court decision " quite properly denying relief to
guards at Bridgewater who sought to enjoin the film's showing in New
York may have prompted Professor Miller to state that he is "far from
certain that the common law's response ever will be sufficiently flexible
to achieve the desired goal. Indeed, the deficiencies of the current doctrines may increase as public and private sector data systems mushroom
and integrate." " For this reason he believes legislative and administrative regulation is necessary. Recognizing the difficulty of formulating administrative and legislative controls that can withstand constitutional challenge, covering disseminators, Professor Miller reluctantly
suggests that part of the solution may be to permit the media certain
privileges that the rest of us do not possess.80 I, however, do not believe
that freedom of speech can be exercised by a surrogate on the individual's behalf and would prefer to have the area of free exchange of
information and discussion expanded for all rather than contracted.
CONCLUSION

The state should and does protect the individual against the unauthorized commercial exploitation of his name or picture and, to a
large extent, against intrusion into his home and the bugging of his
81356 Mass. at -, 249 N.E.2d at 618.
2
at -, 249 N.E.2d at 619.

s Id.
83 A.

Mniza, supra note 1, at 208.
84 Cullen v. Grove Press, Inc., 276 F. Supp. 727 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
85 A. Mni.za, supra note 1, at 209.
8 Id. 198-99. The press has on occasion asserted that it does indeed possess
privileges that others do not. See, e.g., Caldwell v. United States, 434 F2d 1081
(9th Cir. 1970), cert. granted, 402 U.S. 942 (1971) (right of reporter to refuse to
appear before grand jury even when granted a qualified privilege to protect confidentiality of the sources of his information).
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telephone. The law can insure that information supplied to public or
private agencies under promises of confidentiality is kept secret. I am
also prepared to assert that the state should insist that records about anindividual are complete, accurate, and, to the extent possible, not subject to misinterpretation, although I hesitate to assert that those rights
should be enforceable against newspapers or the government's national
security files. The law of libel presently affords some protection against
the dissemination of false information, and, insofar as it is possible to.
distinguish between commercial and noncommercial uses of data, I favor
extending liability for furnishing inaccurate information when special
damages can be shown. I strongly support measures that place the
burden on credit and insurance companies of proving that certain
personal data is material to their risk and that, if such proof is offered,
authorize only an additional charge rather than a denial of serviceFinally, the range of factors declared by statute to be irrelevant toemployment should be expanded.
Beyond this, I am reluctant to make any concession to the computer. I do not want to suppress information merely because people
might feel better if certain publicly available facts could not be disseminated; I would restrict the uses of information that might tangibly
harm an individual but not the right of others to know. I do not think
that an effective distinction can be drawn between mere "idle curiosity"
and an interest in "newsworthy" events; what a person wants to know
is for that person to decide and regulation in this area should be left to,
self-policing, public opinion, and economic pressure. I endorse Professor Miller's proposal for an independent federal agency to coordinate
the government's information-handling activities and procedures, and I
concur with him that an omnibus privacy statute would inevitably be
shot through with national security and foreign policy exceptions that
would make it nothing but a set of pious platitudes. Specific statute&
directed at the government's surveillance activities would, however, be
desirable, particularly if congressional review of those activities were
provided. For the rest, I see no alternative to a hope-foolish as it may
be-in the moral betterment of man that will reflect itself in a greater
concern for responsible government and respect for one's fellows.
I can only conclude by urging the reader of this Commentary to,
read The Assault on Privacy. It is a scholarly and encyclopedic study
of an extremely important social issue, and though Professor Miller
does have a certain moral predisposition, it does not affect the objectivity of his presentation. Indeed, on a subject as controversial as
this one, he owed it to his readers to let them know where he stands.
There is a great deal to ponder in his book. I have barely scratched
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the surface. The question of individual privacy is, unlike the questions
usually pursued in law reviews, one upon which most men will have to
take sides. Some accommodation must be made between the need for
individual privacy and the need of free men to seek the truth and to say
what they please. Miller clearly and vividly describes the framework in
which this accommodation will have to be made. He also suggests
where that accommodation should be made. On this point, men can
differ, and I do differ with Miller. The reader must, of course, decide
the matter for himself, and he must do so with full knowledge that
Miller and I have not exhausted the range of possible decisions. One
could not do better than to read Professor Miller's book and to use the
factual material and policy arguments contained in it as a point of
reference for his own exploration of the area.

